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CAMERON BISHOP
Singing in the Wind: Beyond the Peace/War Dichotomy
If the Other is a possible world, I am a past world. The mistake of theories of knowledge is that 
they postulate the contemporaneity of subject and object, whereas one is only constituted through 
the annihilation of the Other.
Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 1990.1
In the months of May and June of 2011 Australia lost four soldiers in three weeks fighting the 
War on Terror in Afghanistan. It took the total number of Australian soldiers killed to twenty-seven. 
In their efforts to bring peace and democracy to the country the coalition of foreign forces was 
facing increasing resistance from the Taliban. Peace, in the context of our current wars (in Iraq and 
Afghanistan) seems a distant prospect and yet it is for that quixotic notion that the wars are being 
fought. The concept, peace, can only be illuminated by its opposite. Without war there would be no 
peace. In a geopolitical and technological dynamic that at once reinforces borders for some, while 
dissolving them for others, it seems that peace remains necessarily unattainable. In the biopolitical 
regulation of populations war is literally at the front line. As Michel Foucault pointed out, wars “are 
waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purposes 
of wholesale destruction in the name of life necessity.”2 Writing in the 1970s Foucault presciently 
forecast the perpetual war that we now live in; a war fought on behalf of what? In his discussion of 
biopower and subjectivity Foucault concludes “massacres have become vital.”3 They are carried 
out under the promise of a peace to come; a striving-towards-peace; a becoming-peace; a peace 
that cannot unfold because, like the word ‘terror,’ it is an abstraction. In the past when peace 
was reached war still remained as a bruise. And so it will with our current wars. The wholesale 
destruction of a country’s population and infrastructure have become necessary spectacles in the 
administering of life for the individual, for underneath the shock and awe lies the message for the 
viewer – ‘you’ are allowed to live. 
In this article, I suggest that it is at the threshold of life that biopolitical distinctions, and thus 
distinctions of peace and war, collapse. In their book, Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
discuss biopower and biopolitical distinctions.4 For them, the concept of peace can only emerge 
through the process of war. The paradox that there can be no peace without war is co-extensive 
to Hardt and Negri’s description of the current “supranational right” which assumes and acts in 
(to use Giorgio Agamben’s now prevalent phrase), a “state of exception.” This “state of exception” 
enables preemptive strikes and the detention of people, outside the rule of law and habeas corpus, 
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in indeterminate places such as Guantanamo Bay.5 All this is seen in light of globalisation where 
the “supranational right” 
presents itself as capable of treating the universal, planetary sphere as a single systemic set, it 
… assume[s] an immediate prerequisite (acting in a state of exception) and an adequate, plastic, 
and constitutive technology (the techniques of the police).6 
As part of the Coalition of the Willing, the Australian Army is a component of the corporeal body 
enforcing the aspirations of the “supranational right.” One of the major functions of the Australian 
army in Afghanistan is to train a local army and police force to maintain law and order once the 
foreign forces withdraw. Presumably, on the other side of the withdrawal, peace will reign, but it is a 
peace that comes about because of war and the imposition of a biopolitics that Agamben suggests 
constitutes the human as “the living being who … separates and opposes himself to his own bare 
life.”7 At the same time, Agamben adds, humanity “maintains” its image “in relation to that bare 
life in an inclusive exclusion.”8 Beyond this intractable paradox where peace can only be conceived 
through war and a global, biopolitical conditioning, where borders and exclusions are maintained 
at all costs, perhaps another view of peace resides. 
In the discussion that follows I use Gilles Deleuze’s analysis of Michel Tournier’s book, Friday, 
or the Other Island (1974), from the appendix to The Logic of Sense, as a set-piece to activate three 
movements of my own. The mythological complex of Friday, Crusoe and their Island is augmented 
by both Deleuze and Tournier within a biopolitical context that deconstitutes the human by opening 
the perceptual field. In this essay I perform a similar task. Using three key images – the Brisbane 
floods of 2011, the final moments of Charlie Kaufman’s film, Synecdoche, New York (2008), and the 
artist Richard Billingham’s photographs and films of animals in zoo enclosures – I explore situations 
that empty the subject of his or her stable reference points and biopolitically defined self. I note 
this not to find epiphany, freedom or pseudo-transcendental transformation, but to describe a re-
combination whereby subjects lose their resemblance in others, the human appears in its absolute 
other (the animal), and the inside is revealed as the outside. These three movements presuppose a 
limit has been reached which gives way to a future perception, one that is not yet total, but will be. 
In the movements I describe, peace and war are rendered moot because biopolitical distinctions 
have dissolved.
In The Open: Man and Animal Giorgio Agamben describes this future perception as a “zone of 
non-knowledge,” beyond logos and history, that charts the human’s becoming; no more a human 
perception because “every rational element” has been forgotten, every “project for mastering its 
animal life” deleted.9 The territory that Agamben marks out in his description of this impending 
collapse into “a-knowledge” draws a line through a number of other thinkers who have sought to 
articulate the problem of human subjectivity within the shifting contexts of the posthuman, including 
Bataille, Kojève and Heidegger, and adds to the antihumanist, decentring ideas of Foucault, Derrida 
and before them, Nietzsche. Near the end of his discussion Agamben includes a comparative 
analysis of Titian’s paintings The Three Ages of Man (1513-14) and Nymph and Shepherd (about 
1570), concluding that between the two works a fundamental shift has taken place in the relations 
of the figures. In the latter work Agamben argues that Titian has gone beyond representing sensual 
pleasure and desire as precursors to sin and death, but renders them as mutual disinhibition and 
disenchantment. In exposing themselves the woman and man have “reached in their fulfillment … 
a higher stage that is beyond both nature and knowledge,” and, Agamben suggests, “concealment 
and disconcealment.” Initiated to their own “lack of mystery” the figures lose their cultural and 
religious constraints and move into a realm where they become “inapparent.”10 The visual analysis 
that Agamben embarks upon is drawn from the compositional shifts that take place between Titian’s 
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works but quickly moves into an analysis of the much wider process of what it is to be human. 
Introducing a discussion of Heidegger’s lectures from 1929-30 (The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude) Agamben demonstrates how the philosopher re-formulates 
the processes of disinhibition. Far from being the animal-with-language, Agamben argues that 
Heidegger’s Dasein (being) is “always already presupposed in every conception (philosophical and 
scientific) of life.”11 Human consciousness comes into being in an openness directly opposed to the 
animal’s “captivation,” or “poverty in world,” as Heidegger terms it. 12 The human is “world-forming” 
while the animal is ensconced in a “disinhibiting ring” in which it is fully absorbed in itself. Basically, 
the animal is captivated within its ring of disinhibitors and cannot sense outside of it. 
As a further example, Agamben uses ninteenth century zoologist Jacob Von Uexkull’s discussion 
of the tick’s absolute absorption in its environment, as distinct from Uexkull’s anthropological 
description of it, to illuminate the austerity of the tick’s experience. Its movement in its purely 
closed bushy environment is limited to the following disinhibitors: the “butyric acid contained in 
all mammals,” “the temperature of 37 degrees Celsius” in mammal blood, and the hairy skin and 
blood vessels of mammals.13 This is the closed, but “disinhibited” environment of the tick, without 
time, and “without world.” Following Heidegger’s use of the term, “disinhibitor,” Agamben concludes 
that the animal inhabits its own “disinhibiting ring,” closed in “the few elements that define its 
perceptual world.”14 Here, in contrast, Agamben asserts that the human world is open, because its 
perceptual field and symbolic order are so much more expansive. Even though we are on the same 
evolutionary continuum as the tick, the human is not “captivated” in its environment, like the tick, 
bee (Heidegger’s example), or goat, but rather open to become inapparent to themselves – as in 
Agamben’s reading of Titian’s two paintings and Deleuze’s reading of Michel Tournier’s Robinson. 
Agamben suggests that disconcealment begets a burden that awakens human consciousness to, 
paradoxically, its own “being-captivated,” while Deleuze interprets Robinson’s radical re-structuring 
of the world as a disinhibition that liberates the senses in concert with the elements. 15 
Figure 1. Cameron Bishop, Habitat 
No.1, After RB (2010). 60 x 80 cm, 
digital print. Collection of the author.
Here, in the beyond of 
nature and knowledge, my 
two launching points come 
together. Eros, climbing the tree 
of knowledge in Titian’s The 
Three Ages becomes a goat 
in the Nymph and Shepherd. 
Attempting to climb (it seems) 
the stump of the tree, the goat 
signifies the loss of mystery 
between the two lovers and a 
state beyond both nature and 
knowledge. In Tournier’s text, 
Deleuze points out, Friday fashions from the goat an instrument to capture the wind. He places it in the 
dead stump of a tree. It captures the elements, and for Deleuze, creates a “pansonority.”16 From Agamben’s 
perspective this might be seen as an act signifying the ways in which humanity suspends its animality, in 
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the very capturing and articulation of the animal.17 Deleuze takes this as an elemental inauguration, 
and the beginning of a series of metamorphoses of island, Friday and Robinson which culminates in 
Robinson’s “dehumanisation.”18 It is here on an island without others that Deleuze/Tournier release 
subjects and others from their place in the perceptual landscape. Indeed Robinson is freed from 
the desires of others; from having to be conscious of others’ perspectives. Tournier’s Robinson, by 
choosing not to be rescued, chooses not to go to war. 
There is no-one to go to war for or against on the island, but rather the island remains an outside 
where the Other reveals itself as the structure conditioning “the entire field and its functioning.”19 
In disavowing the structure-Other Robinson’s subjectivity and relations are reconstituted in a space 
without hierarchy, beyond nature and knowledge. The human skull, in the metaphor of pansonority, 
could easily replace that of the goat’s head, channeling and singing the elements in a space that 
closes off human openness and conjoins it with the disinhibited animal. Peace, in this consecration, 
remains unthought of, while war is rendered impossible. With the disappearance of those others 
that structure and limit consciousness on Tournier’s and Deleuze’s island, it follows that there are 
no longer any potential combatants or allies to enter into an aggravated peace – and in the context 
of our contemporary conflicts, a War on Terror that is, as Judith Butler describes, both “limitless 
and without end.”20 
For the remainder of this essay, I explore three movements, or shifts, that subvert the structure 
and relations of self and others within the peace/war dichotomy. They each point to a future without 
the biopolitical distinctions that come from our relations with others, and hence imagine a future 
where peace is unthought of and war becomes an impossibility. In the duration of these movements 
subjects move smoothly across surfaces and through others, causing temporal shifts in identity 
and perspective, objects are caught in horizontal lines of strata, and, as Agamben might suggest, 
a disappearance of the human is triggered by the reactivation of its “animal relation with the 
disinhibitor.”21 I take three different events as trigger points for analysis. The first, the Queensland 
floods of 2011, as filmed by citizens and news media and posted on YouTube, is concerned with the 
literal unfolding of the inside into the outside to reveal a movement without depth and a surface 
that emphasises horizontality. In the second movement I use the last set-piece of Charlie Kaufman’s 
film Synecdoche, New York, to look at and through the character, Caden Cotard, as he wanders 
the streets of a city within a city within a city; a simulacrum where, in the trajectory he takes in 
the film, he ends up a shuffling husk through which others see, speak and act. Finally, in the third 
movement, I describe the works in Richard Billingham’s 2007 exhibition at the Australian Centre 
for Contemporary Art. Backgrounded by the artifice of the zoo enclosure, Billingham’s images of 
animals capture the human in animal form, locating the anthropomorphic psychic trauma that 
comes with incarceration in the blank stares, regurgitations, and repetitive behaviours of a literal 
“animal captivation.”22 Each movement opens a window onto possible experiences that lie beyond 
the biopolitical conditions of peace/war. They align the subject with three contemporary exit points, 
each heralding a future exodus from our abiding faiths. 
FIRST MOVEMENT: THE RESEMBLANCE OF THINGS PRESENT
In late 2010 and early 2011 the east coast of Australia was inundated with a series of weather 
events that brought heavy rains and cyclones. They came at the end of a long drought; what at 
first was welcome became a ferocious torrent. The inland city of Towoomba, Queensland, and its 
surrounding valley experienced unprecedented flash flooding, taking a number of lives and destroying 
hundreds of homes and businesses. Within hours the spectacle had been uploaded to YouTube. 
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Footage of cars and whole houses being 
swept away made for a spellbinding vision. 
Of course the spectacle was perpetuated 
by the compulsion to witness multiple 
angles on the single event, from the bird’s 
eye view of the helicopter to the workers 
filming the street becoming a river from their 
second storey office. The spectacle was in 
everyone’s eye, not just that of the journalist 
reporting the event. 
After the initial floods in the upper 
valley, hydrologists and meteorologists 
soon began warning of a massive volume 
of water headed Brisbane’s way. The 
spectacle moved down river. In Brisbane, 
at Kangaroo Point, Australia’s news media 
gathered to watch the slow inundation take 
effect. From this elevation and other safe 
distances around Brisbane thousands of 
hours of footage were taken of the flood’s 
slow progression into many of Brisbane’s low 
lying suburbs. The flood itself lasted about 
three days, yet if you were to string all the 
possible versions of the event together the 
footage would outlast the actual event by 
many months. The event, in this instance, 
Figure 2. Cameron Bishop Afterimage, Object Stack No.1 (2011). 
65 x 48 cm, digital print. Collection of the author.
became dispersed among many authors. With the conjunction of new technology and spectacle the 
event was decentralized. Each version of it represented a possible world as described by Deleuze: 
the expressed possible world certainly exists, but it does not exist (actually) outside of that which 
expresses it.23
The catastrophic event, as it sweeps away, in real-time, subjects and objects, becomes 
incommensurable with its representation. The many views and durations offered of the one event 
are distributed by digital code and form into what is ostensibly a horizontal dispersal across the 
network and onto screens, like the floodwaters, they accentuate a horizontal movement and lateral 
becoming. As the floodwaters rose to inundate around sixty suburbs of Brisbane, it moved without 
favour; the water flooded homes, streets, and suburbs and, inevitably, met with some blockages 
and resistance to flows, but its surface spread could not be contained. Artifacts from contemporary 
society were unhinged from their use-value, and forced downstream, into a flow of equilibrium. The 
movement mirrors Robinson’s loss of others on the island where he discovers “the surface” and 
the “otherwise-other” (Friday) after severing himself from the structure-Other.24 Watching footage 
of the floods rising, unfolding and spreading, does not necessarily designate a depth reading, but 
also signifies the surface, at which for Deleuze an “unknown image of things” becomes detached.25
By participating in the many views of the event I am opened to new worlds, in this case multiple 
views of the same disaster. If I were Robinson, I would know nothing of this disaster from my island, 
I could not recognise it. I have not yet disavowed the structure-Other but in the images I am able to 
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envisage its erasure. The others with their cameras and mobile phones relay to me a great cultural 
disturbance, one which reflects Robinson’s insinuation into a “pure surface.”26 Both a rupture and 
lateral-becoming are described in the floating objects, at once bound to use and cultural significance. 
In this instance, they are lifted horizontally, into a plane of immanence without depth and beyond 
the binary distinctions that encode objects with cultural value. Deleuze articulates Robinson’s loss 
of depth perception thus: “In opposition to the deep earth, air and sky describe a pure surface.”27 
He links this loss of depth perception to the disappearance of others and a new solipsistic vision in 
which Robinson inhabits an environment “without potentialities or virtualities,” where the “abyss 
and the abstract line have replaced the relief and the background”.28 Resemblance has lost its 
affect in Robinson’s world as Deleuze describes it. The flood, in its duration and spectacle, allowed 
a glimpse into a world without resemblance, not in its sublime power and depth, but in its even 
dispersion and surface release. 
From the cliffs of Kangaroo Point, residents of the city of Brisbane whose houses were under no 
immediate threat, and hundreds of media personnel, charged with the responsibility of distributing 
the spectacle, witnessed a deterritorialisation of contemporary artifacts. Luxury boats, floating 
restaurants, and fixed (1000 tonne) walkways detached from their moorings, furniture, and millions 
of other everyday artifacts passed by on their slow journey to the sea. There were connections and 
dislocations, inexorable destruction. The giant waterway, which spread itself across a width of many 
kilometres in some areas, became a mobile floating object, its use value rendered null and void; an 
instance where there “is no possible hierarchy, no second, no third …”29 For me, the images, captured 
from numerous vantage points above the swollen river, bear witness to Deleuze’s interpretation of 
the simulacrum. The simulacrum of images renders the “fixity of distribution” and “the determination 
of the hierarchy impossible,” establishing a “world of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchies.” 
“Resemblance subsists,” for a time, “but it is produced as the external effect of the simulacrum, in 
as much as it is built on divergent series and makes them resonate.”30 
Amid the numerous images of the floods that wrought havoc on Queensland and Victoria, a few 
stand out. Many of the houses hit by the torrent in the upper reaches of the Lockyer valley resembled 
broken husks; relieved of their insides they were often found hundreds of metres from where they 
originally stood. Once the waters reached Brisbane it was more of a slow rise, from which people had 
the opportunity to escape. In moving images of the event, the objects, in many cases backgrounded 
only by the milky brown of the river, gave the impression that it was the viewer who was moving. It is 
mesmerising to watch a city’s contents laid bare in peaceful repose. The world becomes unfounded 
and unfolds itself in a universal breakdown of its contents. In one piece of footage, what was once 
an exclusive, floating restaurant becomes artifact as it peacefully drifts downstream. Suddenly a 
bridge looms up and it is clear the restaurant is too high for it to pass under safely. As it hits the 
bridge the elemental force of the water folds the restaurant into itself; it emerges on the other side 
of the bridge like a picnic table, flattened, without resemblance. The inside folds outward, to reveal 
itself as always having been exterior, open to the elements, like the objects revealed to us at a 
rubbish dump – “the shit end of capitalism.”31 And on the sea floor in Moreton Bay, at the mouth 
of the Brisbane River, lie millions of incidental items from our present culture; perhaps the first in 
a stratified layer of objects to be put on display in some post-Empire museum. 
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SECOND MOVEMENT: THE SELF DISPERSED
The specifics hardly matter. Everyone is everyone.
Caden Cotard in Synecdoche, New York (2008).32
At the end of Charlie Kaufman’s 2008 film Synecdoche, New York the main character, Caden 
Cotard, wanders the streets of a city of his own imagining. The space he roams is in a warehouse within 
a warehouse within a warehouse, each one containing Cotard’s scaled-down replicas of New York. A 
theatre director, he receives a grant with a limitless budget and in spending it becomes immersed 
in a vain search for the truth of his life. As a result, down to the tiniest detail, every simulation he 
comes to recreate must represent the truth of what happened (happens) in Caden Cotard’s life. 
This includes the interactions he has with people both close to him and peripheral, revivified in the 
actors he hires to play them. Within the increasingly faithful recreations of New York City that he 
builds, Cotard goes as far as commissioning several versions of himself. With each new Cotard, it 
seems, there is a corresponding replica of New York that must be built in ever more exacting detail. 
His supplementary selves end up improvising his life, in his place, both with the first versions of 
those from outside the stage and the supplementary versions of others in his life. At one point he 
sleeps with the actress playing the woman he is in love with. Although the palimpsest is absurdist 
in its implied, infinite layers, the final walk the director takes is quite moving, precisely because we 
watch a husk of a man, emptied of self, negotiate the last moments of his “bare life.”33
Figure 3. Charlie Kaufman, Synecdoche, New York (2008). Film still. Reproduced with permission from Likely Story and 
Village Roadshow.
He comes to live his real-time life in a simulacrum, before and beyond an original, replica, or 
model. This space that no longer has an outside exemplifies Deleuze’s understanding that one of the 
dominant themes in Foucault’s work is that the “inside is constituted by the folding of the outside.”34 
It is apparent that what is inside this space/subject at the end of Kaufman’s film is constructed 
purely from the outside. With Cotard’s immersion in simulacra we bear witness to a “becoming-
mad,” or a “becoming unlimited.”35 At the end of the film there are four versions of himself, the 
last of whom is embodied by a woman. The last actor hired to play Cotard directs and narrates him 
through the last moments of his life. After being woken by gunfire, the last shots in an unnamed 
war, coming from the outside he himself has constructed, his body dutifully takes instructions from 
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this last actor. She tells him to get up, and walk through the streets where he discovers everybody 
is dead; all of his friends and their doubles (and their doubles) are dead. All of the Others are gone. 
Not in a conscious rejection of the structure-Other, like Deleuze/Tournier’s Robinson, but through 
attrition, the others have disappeared and he, as a result, is rendered inapparent. There are no 
longer any other possible worlds that Others can open for him; like Robinson, his is a space that 
is now an abyss: open, unforgiving, without limits and others; both closed (closing) and liberated.
In Deleuze/Tournier’s Robinson, we witness the closing of a perceptual field due to the absence of 
others. It mimics that of the tick, mentioned earlier, who finds itself embedded within a “disinhibited” 
environment without time and “without world.”36 Not limited to the extreme of the tick’s, Robinson’s 
perceptual field is, however, at once closed and liberated, because it is without resistance, on the 
disinhibited environment of the island. Even when Friday arrives on the island Robinson’s libidinal 
desires have been channeled into Speranza (the island). For Deleuze, Friday is not a re-vivified other 
who brings structure and depth to the world again (they are gone) but a channel for the liberation 
of the “image without resemblance.” Robinson discovers through Friday an “otherwise-other,” and 
“the elemental beyond” in the body of a double, and in pricking the surface “ethereal images rise 
up.”37 At the end of Synecdoche, New York Kaufman performs a similar pricking of the surface as 
the viewer’s perceptual field shifts in the channeling of others through the body we know as Cotard. 
Not only have we been insinuated into Cotard’s view of things, and beyond that into the view of 
the others that see and act through him, but the actor narrating his/her last moments speaks in 
the second person, to us. Cotard becomes her Friday and ours, and in these moments of multiple 
channelling, identity scrambling and desubjectivisation, a melancholic realisation takes hold. The 
empty shell of Cotard channels for us our last moments; moments where objects and subjects 
become detached from the spaces and the narratives that supported them.
Opposed to the surface release that the viewer witnesses at the end of Charlie Kaufman’s film, 
the approach humans have towards space – territorializing it and segmenting it to give it background 
and depth (as Foucault and Baudrillard have pointed out) – presupposes that what exists outside, 
like the outside of Plato’s cave, is the real space. The zoo, like Deleuze/Tournier’s island and Cotard’s 
giant set, is a space against which the human illuminates and tests its own reality.
THIRD MOVEMENT: INHIBITED ANIMAL
Giorgio Agamben articulates for us the limits within which modern subjectivity is restrained. 
In his book on the figure of homo sacer (sacred or accursed man) he suggests that contemporary 
subjectivity emerges in “the camp as biopolitical space of the modern.”38 Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life extends Foucault’s analysis of subjectivisation whereby the individual comes 
to internalise external power structures and check themselves accordingly.39 Agamben posits the 
camp, the space where the juridico-political order is suspended in a state of exception (most notably 
in Nazi Germany), as a space where the local is rendered foreign, and in which the bare life – the 
simple fact of biological existence – of the individual is exposed.40  Agamben maps out the idea of 
bare life as the very fact of our biological existence – a delineated life made clear in the biopolitical 
conjoining of space and subject. Agamben argues that the human maintains itself in relation to 
its animal self by creating lines of demarcation in a number of discourses and that the conception 
of space is critical to this delineation. In his view, the concentration camp, where the animal is 
separated out from the human, is “the new biopolitical nomos of the planet.”41 Agamben shows 
how “an apparently innocuous space actually delimits a space in which the normal order is de facto 
suspended.”42 Here a state of exception beyond the limit of the juridico-political order is imposed. 
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He asserts that this is the paradigm in which we are currently ensconced even though we may carry 
on as if space was segmented. The camp is totalising (just as the globalising affects of Empire are 
for Hardt and Negri). The camp can appear anywhere. Agamben calls this a “dislocating localization 
that exceeds” determinate space and “into which every form of life and every rule can be virtually 
taken.”43 He argues that delineated/disciplinary space is no longer necessary to ordering our “forms 
of life;” that juridico-political black holes can appear anywhere and any one of us is liable to be 
dragged into one.44 Agamben articulates this as the Western individual’s modern day underlying 
fear, against which we structure our behaviour.45 
Subjection to such a black hole creates a jarring effect, a dislocation, whereby home is suddenly 
rendered alien, and there are no others to see through. Displaced from home, the subject is stripped 
of any tendrils that place it in a cultural, even biological order, as in spaces such as Guantanomo Bay 
and on Australia’s Christmas Island Detention Centre for asylum seekers. Agamben, though, tells us 
that those spaces that operate in a “state of exception” suspend us all in a paradoxical position of 
“inclusive exclusion;” simply because the human “is the living being” whose biopolitic “separates 
and opposes itself to its own bare life and, at the same time, maintains itself in relation to that 
bare life in an inclusive exclusion.”46 We all live with the threat of encampment, of being rendered 
without Others. This experience of being delocalised at home finds an analogue in the experience 
of the animals we see living out their days in the zoo and in Richard Billingham’s 2007 exhibition, 
People, Places, Animals at the Australian Centre for Contemporary Art. 
Figure 4. Cameron Bishop, Habitat No.2, After RB (2010). 42 x 80 cm, digital print. Collection of the author.
In his dystopic rendering of life in the zoo which, when exhibited at ACCA in 2007, sat alongside 
the series of photographs, Ray’s a Laugh (2000), Billingham reveals some uncomfortable 
anthropomorphic features of the animal. They come to light in the artifice of the zoo, a space 
where animals have been removed from their habitat and placed in environs that mimic it; they are 
literally inhibited. Disinhibition, as it was for the lovers in Titian’s painting, is both an opening and a 
closing, folding and unfolding into a paradoxical becoming of disconcealment. The silverback gorilla 
in Billingham’s film at first looks to be eating for sustenance (as we all must). After a while though 
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it becomes clear that what he is in fact doing is swallowing his food and then regurgitating it, over 
and over again, in a repetition that signifies the human-becoming of animal. Elephants sway back 
and forth in what at first seems like a short film loop, a panda lies slumped in its enclosure; this is 
their endurance, and it comes in a space of inclusive exclusion. Literally delocalised, the animals’ 
disinhibitors become facsimilies, degraded copies of what they might find in their natural habitat – 
gravel as opposed to forest floor, concrete pools instead of rivers, lakes or ponds. The simulation of 
their environment acts as a counterpoint to Robinson’s restructured perceptual field on the island. 
Deleuze interprets the island as a simulacrum of pure surfaces, without depth, whereas the zoo 
enacts depth readings and biopolitical distinctions on a number of fronts: anthropological, zoological 
and evolutionary. Billingham’s images suggest an anthropogenic becoming-mad and, at the same 
time, suggest a real capacity for the animal to perceive things outside of its disinhibiting ring. 
For this article, I bestow upon the tick consciousness; a knowledge that it is in the world. I 
imagine an animal consciousness which Agamben, drawing on Heidegger’s 1929-30 course and 
discussion of animal captivation and the open, attempts to push beyond.  Agamben suggests 
that, rather than being outside in a purity beyond human consciousness, the animal is “open in a 
non-disconcealment.”47 Disinhibited, Tournier’s Robinson has no relation to others, he becomes 
closed-in-the-world rather than open to it, no longer inside or outside but immersed in the pure 
surface of the simulacrum. Billingham’s animals, on the other hand, paradoxically display the most 
depressing signs of humanity – madness – while allowing the human subject a reterritorialisation 
in the world; to know themselves against others. To see through the eyes of Billingham’s depressed 
animals allows for a reappraisal of the way we order our own space; like Kaufman’s film it prompts 
the human to recognise its own spatial simulations, limitations and hierarchical fictions. 
A PEACEFUL CONTUSION: CONCLUSION
…I must consider myself human and a bride of the sky. But that kind of anthropomorphism is 
meaningless. The truth is that at the height to which Friday and I have soared, difference of sex 
is left behind. Friday may be identified with Venus, just as I might be said, in human terms, to 
open my body to the embrace of the sun.
Michel Tournier, Friday.48
In Deleuze’s reading of the structure-Other affect, the perceptual field is governed by the 
possibilities the Other offers. This perceptual field of possibilities is also evident in Caden Cotard’s 
dissolution as increasingly, in the trajectory his form takes in the film, he is filled with the thoughts 
of others. He is at first de-captivated, the space in which he takes his final steps is a palimpsest 
with no floor and no end; the space can go on in a limitless reproduction of itself, ever widening. As 
Cotard rides his golf cart, and shuffles through the remaining moments of his life a sense of calm 
envelops him. His inner monologue, delivered to him, and to us, by the last of the hired actors, speaks 
to him in the second person and in a female voice, finally disconnecting Cotard from himself. His 
simulacra, of his own creation, become his ring of disinhibitors within which he is captivated. He is 
no longer the hinge for the inward-folding of space and the outward-folding of self. His conscious 
trajectory comes to its inevitable end. The walking husk that we see rendered in the final set-piece 
has marked a passage for others to see through, as others have opened new worlds for him.
Like an embedded tick with no visible effect on the skin we continue to reject the possibilities that 
the structure-Other presents in us. The animal, as Other par-excellence (having its modern avatars 
in the form of the terrorist and foreigner) presents a possible world of disinhibition, like the lovers 
in Titian’s painting. The gorilla looks at us with our own eyes. This is not a transcendent imagining 
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of animal-becoming but a pure surface with no inhibitors to measure oneself against, only others 
to see through and become aerial with – as in Tournier’s solar metaphor. The affects of watching 
the devastated Queensland floods, photographing the aftermath of the Victorian floods, and most 
distressingly, as I first sat down to write this conclusion, watching the Christchurch earthquake, 
force me to confront the loss of others and what that means to me. The events have allowed me 
to open three windows that provide alternatives to the peace/war dichotomy. Additionally, they 
activate a reading of surface in a post structure-Other world. Violence has been enacted, but without 
peace as its end goal, and in catastrophic natural disasters it is non-hierachical, as in Deleuze’s 
simulacrum.49 Robinson’s withdrawal, like Cotard’s essential vacancy and the fusion of the human 
with its absolute other in the visage of the ape, engenders a disinhibited freedom beyond knowledge; 
a singing in the wind. 
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